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ABSTRACT  
The paper investigates the role of trust in fund managers’ investment process. Three types of 
trust - personal trust, organizational trust and system trust have been identified in Chinese 
fund managers’ investment practice. The impacts of different types of trust on mutual funds’ 
performance are then examined empirically. 
Through an in-depth investigation of 96 actively managed Chinese mutual funds, this paper 
reveals how trust is formed between fund managers and listed companies.  Fund managers’ 
portfolio performance is measured using both risk-adjusted measurement and simple absolute 
returns. The performance of fund managers’ market timing is also provided. 
 Using cross-sectional regression analysis, a positive relationship is found between Chinese 
fund managers’ portfolio performance and personal trust, while a negative association 
emerges between fund mangers’ performance and system trust. No evidence is found 
between portfolio performance and institutional trust. Overall, fund managers’ trust building 
strategies exert significant impact on funds’ performances.  One major implication of this 
paper is that European fund managers should be aware of the local cultural environment 
should they intend to find Chinese partners in the mutual fund business. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper is motivated by an increased appreciation of the importance of trust in improving 
business performance in competitive markets. In recent organizational studies trust is 
generally believed as “cooperation mechanism” to foster cooperation among partners and to 
reduce risks under uncertainty. The mutual funds industry is no exception. Mutual fund 
managers exercise trust all the time when making investment decisions, but they may not be 
aware of it. In stock markets, information moves prices. It is hard to deny that the information 
required in making a good investment decision can usually only obtained through extensive 
social interactions. While most financial paper promote the idea that using financial models 
to make investment decisions, this paper explores the relationship between mutual fund 
managers and listed companies from a perspective of trust studies. We aim to reveal how 
trust as a non-financial mechanism helps mutual fund managers to reduce investment risk and 
improve their portfolio returns. The concept of trust seems far away from the world of 
finance which usually built upon complicated mathematical models. It was however a word 
often repeatedly stressed by market practitioners and regulators when financial models failed 
to work. 
While trust has become a hot topic in organization studies in recent years, countless 
definitions have been raised by scholars from different perspectives. Followed by Casson’s 
definition of trust, ‘Trust is a confident and warranted belief that the other party will fulfil 
their obligations’. (2006, p343), this paper defines trust as “a warranted belief that other agent 
will provide true information”.  We further propose a three-dimension model of trust to 
mirror how trust facilitates information dissemination in finding a good investment 
opportunity in stock markets. These three dimensions are personal trust, organizational trust 
and system trust. Personal trust refers to one’s trust in his/her personal network. 
Organizational trust refers to one’s trust in an organization. In recent organizational studies, 
an institution can be the object of trust and it is usually established through its market 
reputation, brand management, etc. System trust refers to one’s trust in a country’s legal 
system. For instance, when you want to make a deposit to a mutual fund, which particular 
fund would you prefer to choose?  Will you choose one that one of your friends work for, 
thus you may feel your money is safer with him? Will you choose a fund which has a high 
reputation in the market? Or you might deposit only a small amount of money to a fund 
which you do not have any direct or indirect experience of that fund in the past. It is similar 
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when a mutual fund manager deciding which listed companies to invest in.  We consider the 
investment decision made by mutual fund manager is based upon a three-dimension trust 
model. The diagram below demonstrates our model. 
 
 
 
 
                            
This paper set the Chinese stock markets as the test bed of the proposing trust model and 
concentrates on how mutual fund managers bridge trust with listed companies. We believe 
that the pairing of the Chinese fund manager and listed companies provides the best setting to 
achieve the goal. First, stock markets represent the highest form of institutional development. 
One obvious characteristic of stock markets is information transparency. Each listing 
company by regulation has to publish their financial performance regularly to public. As the 
information is audited and it is freely available, it is basically the best indicator of impersonal 
trust and should be able to allow us to test how much investors rely on such information in 
making their investment decision.  Second, even with the provision of better information in 
stock markets than in other markets, Chinese investors often ignored such public information, 
but to obtain private information to pursue investment returns. It is common that investors 
who are connected with listed companies usually make better returns than others.   
This research employs data collected from several sources. Trust data was collected from a 
combination of face-to-face and telephone interviews with 96 Chinese actively managed 
equity fund managers. Data of funds’ NAVs and mutual funds’ institutional characteristics all 
came from annual reports of each fund that published on their companies’ website. 
Additionally, all funds have been manually screened and index funds and fixed income funds 
were excluded.  
Cross-sectional analysis has been employed in this paper. Although this approach has the 
disadvantage of requiring data on managers’ characteristics and their investment behaviours 
which leaves it with a much smaller sample than the usual financial paper, it has a potential 
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advantage by pooling information across managers together rather than treating each manager 
separately.  
A number of results emerge from the empirical test. First, private information plays an 
important role to enhance trust between fund managers and listed firms, therefore improving 
investment returns. Second, fund managers access private information by visiting their 
investment objectives extensively. Third, interpersonal relationship exerts significant impact 
on funds’ performance.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of recent 
relevant literature. Section III proposes the hypotheses. Section IV states the empirical 
framework. Section V presents the predicted signs. Section VI provides source of data and 
the sampling methods. Section VII interprets the results. Section VIII states robustness 
checks. Section IX draws conclusions. Finally, X presents contributions and 
recommendations.  
II. Trust and portfolio performance: the existing evidence 
It is commonly believed that stock markets listed companies, as information providers, tend 
to give information to their favoured users (investors). Therefore, information users who are 
closer to information providers are likely get better information. For example, Kacperczyk 
and Seru(2007) found that fund managers who rely less on information in the public domain 
and more on private information tend to exhibit significantly higher returns. A trust 
relationship however, is needed to facilitate the channel of information flow. Exchange of 
better information demands mutual commitment of both providers and users of information. 
At the macro-level, the enforcement of the legal system in a market is also needed, as it 
determines the dominant channel through which information is distributed in the market.  
The aim of this research was to investigate the main drivers that can explain the differences in 
fund managers’ investment performance using established theories of trust. Given that 
possession of better information is the key for any successful investment, this paper examines 
fund managers’ trust in different types of information and how the differences in trust were 
associated with the differences in their investment returns.  
Our work links a large body of literature on the performance of investment of mutual funds 
with a growing literature on the role of social trust in financial investment.  
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Conceptualization of trust  
System trust  
System trust is an inevitable source in determining a trustor’s trust in an organization due to 
the reason that all organizations are influenced by the macro environment in which they are 
operating. System trust was suggested by Luhmann (1979; 1988), Barber (1983) and Giddens 
(1990) for its function of reducing the complexity of reality. Luhmann (1979) distinguishes 
between personal trust and trust in the reliable functioning of certain system trust. He claims 
that as the social order becomes more complex, personal trust is not sufficient to control 
relationships effectively. Therefore system trust has become more important. For Luhmann, 
system trust is trust or confidence in a highly abstract system, such as the political system or 
legal system, therefore system is both an object and source of trust (Luhmann, 1979, cited in 
Lane, 1998, p.16). Bachmann (2001) also emphasises the importance of system trust. He 
points out that trust studies should based on ‘…a sufficiently deep understanding of social 
reality’ and regards that ‘…mass-production’ of system trust is a precondition of a high level 
of trust between organizations.  
It is also recognized by Bachmann (2001), Lane and Bachmann (1996) and Zucker (1986) 
that inter-organizational trust is especially dependent on and mediated by the institutional 
framework in which the relationship is embedded. In Bachmann (1999)’s work, he echoed 
Lumann (1979)’ and Giddens (1990)’s ‘system trust’ based on ‘systems theory’ and 
‘structuration theory’ and further addresses that a wider view of inter-organizational trust 
would identify a pre-requisite for trust in the contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, 
process, or procedures that exist in the market framework. For example, investors need to 
trust the system of banking, exchange, currency and legal enforcement before they trade. For 
Zucker (1986), system trust is a type of trust which is not dependent on interpersonal 
familiarity and common history but where reliance is on formal, socially produced and 
legitimate structures that guarantee trust. Bachmann (1999, 2005) compared the German and 
UK system, he arguing that the German system is generally characterised by a high capacity 
to produce system trust.  
Personal trust  
Personal trust, as used in this paper, refers to trust in other people. Extensive research has 
stressed the importance of individuals and their relationship in inter-organizational trust. It is 
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not only because trust originally exists at personal level, but also organizations are made up 
of individuals and these individuals play a crucial role in organizations. More importantly, it 
is through those individuals that the inter-organizational relations come into effect (Aulakh et 
al. 1996).   Personal trust can be further divided into two broad categories - one is trust in 
family members and close friends, this type of trust is also called ‘thick trust’ by Putnam 
(2000, p.136). Another is trust in non-family and non-friend members. It is also called ‘thin 
trust’ by Putnam (2000, p.136). 
Organizational trust  
Organization trust is another important source in determining whether or not a trustor will 
place trust in an organization. Organizations always have strong motivation to keep a brand 
name and maintain their reputation (Casson, 1991). The impersonal trust towards 
organizations as trustees has been developed further by Nooteboom (2001, 2003), who 
believes that ‘…like people, organizations can be the object of trust, in both their competence 
and their intentions. For example, organizations have an interest in maintaining their 
reputation and brand name.’ (Nooteboom, 2003, p.5). From his point of view, trust in an 
organization may be based on two aspects. First, trust is based on technological, innovative, 
commercial, organizational and managerial competence offered by this organization, which 
can be called ‘competence trust’. Second, trust is based on the willingness of keeping a 
reputable name by an institution, which can be called ‘intentional trust’. Although the 
proposed competence of trust and intentional trust views of an organization have not been 
empirically tested, it opens up the opportunities to test these specific organizational trusts 
empirically in so far that they are distinct from characteristics at personal level.  
In light of the above, organizational trust should be considered as one important indicator of 
trust to facilitate a trustor’s trust in this particular organization apart personal trust presented 
previously.   
In financial market, trust has been approved empirically that has direct positive impact on 
institutions’ financial performance. Uzzi (1999) investigates the relationship between bankers 
and MSE owners. He presents evidence that small business owners who own embedded ties 
with banks are more likely to get loans and to receive lower interest rates on loans. Cohen 
(2008) uncovers that mutual fund managers usually place a larger bet on listed companies 
which they are connected with. Using the data showing the corporate board members who 
shared a common educational history with fund managers, he further evidenced that fund 
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managers’ investment in connected stocks outperform the investment in non-connected 
stocks by 8.4% per year.  
Both of the above papers focused purely on trust between individuals - personal trust. 
However, as investors in stock markets, they also have access to more information 
disseminated through other channels, such as financial disclosures and company visiting.  
Only by adding these channels one can provide a full picture of an investor’s decision making 
process. For example, when a mutual fund manager evaluates a listed company, where does 
his trust in this company come from? Will his trust come from public information disclosed 
by the company and regulated by the authority? Will his trust simply come from an insider 
who he is connected with, or will it come from his effort and time spent on communication 
with that company? These questions are this paper’s core interests and we provide an 
empirical research to answer the above questions.  
 
III.Hypotheses 
Based on the discussion above, we draw testable hypotheses regarding the impact of different 
types of trust on fund managers’ portfolio performance and market timing. By measuring 
personal trust via fund managers’ attitudes to private information, measuring system trust via 
managers’ attitudes to public information and measuring organizational trust via a group of 
selected institutional characteristics including reputation, openness, leadership and 
governance structure, we hypotheses: 
Personal Trust vs. Organizational Trust 
H1: Fund managers who incorporate more with interpersonal relations have better selective 
performances and inferior timing performance.  
H2: Fund managers who place more emphasis on institutional arrangements have better 
selective performances but no worse timing performance.  
System Trust 
H3: The weight that fund managers rely on public information negatively relates to funds’ 
selective performance, but no worse timing performances.  
Interaction  
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H4: The frequency of visiting to listed firms will be positively related to a fund manager’s 
selective performance and will be unrelated to his timing performance.  
Culture  
H6: Funds which are located in the north area of China have better performance than the ones 
located in the south area.  
Personal characteristics of fund managers  
H7: Older fund managers perform better than younger fund managers.  
IV.Empirical framework 
Fixed effects cross-section regression is used to analyze the impact of different types of trust 
on fund managers’ portfolio performance under three different measures.  
The first step of methodology design is to examine the performances of portfolios. Both risk-
adjusted measures and none risk-adjusted measures are employed. First, Jensen’s   is 
calculated as funds’ risk-adjusted performance using the Shanghai Stock Market composite 
index as benchmark. Second, we also measured the absolute returns of portfolios without 
comparing to a benchmark. It is measured as three years’ average of total amount of capital 
gain from equity investment and dividend received. Third, standard deviation of Cash holding 
position for each portfolio is applied as an alternative measure of market timing in this thesis.  
Next, three models are then constructed with the above three different dependent variables 
and a same group of explanatory variables. The three dependent variables are JENSEN, 
ABSTKRTN, and CASHSTDEV, respectively. 
ijr   = 0 + 1  INTPLT i + 2  INST i + 3  SYST i +  VISITTOTAL i  +  VISITSMALL i +  
6 SOCIALIZEFIRMS i + 7 TYPE i + 8 STYLE i + 9 LOCATION i + 10  SIZETOTAL i + 11 AVERAGESIZE i + 12
MGRAGE i + 13  GENDER i + u i             (1) 
                           j= JENSEN, ABSTKRTN, CASHSTDEV, respectively  
 
Dependent variables  
1. Jensen’s measurement  
4 5
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R it -R ft = i + i [R mt -R ft ] + itu                                      (2) 
where   itR  is monthly return of fund i at time t, 
                mtR  is monthly return of market benchmark at time t, 
                 R ft is monthly risk free rate.  
                 it
u
 is random errors which have zero mean and should be serially independent1.
 
2. Simple absolute return of equity investment 
R i = ( 
t i
ii
inEquityInvestment
DividendnCapitalGai 
) / 3                       (3) 
         where    i =1, 2, …100          
                      t =2004, 2005, 2006 respectively 
3. Timing 
ti
CASHSTDEV =  


2006
2004
_
2)((
3
1
t
itit XX                      (4)                   
            where  iX  = Amount of cash holding at year t / Total net asset at year t 
                       t= 2004, 2005, 2006           
                        i=1,2,….,96 
             itX

 = 
t
itX
3
1
,                                          (5) 
            where    t= 2004, 2005, 2006           
                              i=1,2,….,96 
                                                          
1
 According to Jensen (1986, page 394) If itu were not serially independent the manager could increase his 
return even more by taking account of the information contained in the serial dependence and would therefore 
eliminate it.  
10 
 
 
Explanatory variables  
First, we include three variables which might be able to explain fund managers’ performance. 
Consistent with previous studies, we construct two aggregated trust variables, such as 
INTPLT and INST as the average of the sum of sub-measures that are reflections of single 
unidimensional trust.  The components of aggregated interpersonal trust (INTPLT) are: 
VISITFRI, INSIDERINF, VISITLONG and HIGHTRUST. The components of aggregated 
institutional trust (INST) are: OWNERSHIP, PROFESSIONAL, REPUTATION, OPENNESS and 
LEADERSHIP. Details about these componential variables can be seen in appendix. 
Second, to capture the importance of interaction between fund managers and listed 
companies, we consider the frequency of fund managers’ site visit, whether they socialized 
with listed firms and whether they prefer to visit small listed firms.  
In addition to the above trust variables and trust related variables, we also include a number 
of control variables in our empirical specifications. We include type which indicates whether 
the fund is an open-end fund or closed-end fund; style which indicates whether the fund is 
growth fund or balance fund; size of a fund and of a fund family; and location which 
differentiate whether the fund is headquartered in the north or the south area of mainland 
China. We also include age and gender of fund managers in our regression models to control 
their impact on performance.  
V. Predicted signs 
Table1: Predicted sign 
 Risk-adjusted portfolio 
performance   (predicted 
sign/actual sign)  
Absolute return of 
portfolio performance   
(predicted sign/actual sign) 
Timing 
(predicted sign/actual sign) 
Characteristics of Funds    
TYPE (open=1, close=0) 
STYLE  
LOCATION 
SIZETOTAL 
AVERAGESIZE 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
Process Trust  
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VISITTOTAL 
VISITSMALL 
SOCIALIZFIRM  
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
Personal Trust 
 
   
INTPLT  
 
+ 
 
+ - 
 
Organizational  
 
   
INST + 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
System Trust    
SYST 
 
- - + 
Characteristics of Fund 
Managers 
   
GENDER 
MNRAGE 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
VI.Data 
To test the hypotheses in the previous section, we use a dataset based on questionnaire-based 
survey that was collected between 2006 and 2008. Data of funds’ NAVs and institutional 
characteristics is collected from annual reports of each fund which was published on their 
companies’ website. Criteria for selecting the sample funds are: equity fund that has been 
established since 1
st
, January, 2004.  
Questionnaire-based survey 
In total 96 interviews were conducted during 2006 to 2008. Principally I interviewed ‘Fund 
Managers’, those who make portfolio invest decisions and interface with listed firms. I also 
interviewed 10 general managers and financial researchers to understand and cross-examine 
the view of other types of personnel who also play an important role in mutual funds’ 
investment activities.  I focused on “fund managers” because they make the judgment as to 
whether to invest in a particular listed firm and consequently can reveal how the relationship 
between fund managers and listed firms affect their funds performances.  
Table2: Profile of interviewees 
Characteristics of fund managers Total 
 Male 90  
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Gender Female 6 96 
 
Age 
<30 years old 7  
96 30-40 years old 76 
>40 years old 13 
 
Snowball sampling  
Interviewees’ names were obtained from each fund’s annual financial report. I used my 
personal contacts to set up initial interviews, and then a ‘snowball’ method has been applied 
to get access to more interviewees.   
Most interviews were held in the three main cities where 99% fund companies are 
headquartered, namely Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. The interviews were conducted 
either face to face or via the telephone. Further follow-up interviews were conducted when I 
was programme coordinator of Chinese senior fund managers’ training programme at the 
ICMA centre during the summer of 2007 and 2008. With the population of active fund 
managers is about 300 by the time we conducted interview, we have covered about 1/3 of 
population.  
 
 
VII.Results 
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Table 3: regression results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cell entries are parameter estimates; standard errors in parentheses; *** and ** denote significance at the 
1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
Discussion on Model 1 
Risk-adjusted performance with interpersonal, institutional and system trust  
As can be seen from the results of model 1 in Table 3, interpersonal trust INTPLT is 
positively related to fund managers’ selectivity performance. The result is significant at the 
 
 
 
JENSEN 
 
(Model 1) 
 
ABSTKRTN 
 
(Model2) 
 
CASHSTDEV 
 
(Model3) 
CONSTANT 
 
-0.378 
(0.45) 
-0.036 
(0.188) 
-0.036 
(0.419) 
TYPE 0.03 
(0.069) 
0.112  
(0.026)***                                                                                                   
 
-0.082 
(0.058) 
STYLE -0.004 
(0.063) 
 
0.031 
(0.024) 
0.073 
(0.053) 
LOCATION -0.016 
(0.063) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
 
0.036 
(0.053) 
SIZETOTAL 0.003 
(0.001)*** 
0.005 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
AVERAGESIZE -0.006 
(0.002)** 
-0.003 
(0.001)*** 
 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
VISITTOTAL 0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001)** 
VISITSMALL 0.017 
(0.064) 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
 
-0.065 
(0.054) 
SOCIALIZEFIRM -0.007 
(0.069) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
 
0.01 
(0.006) ** 
  INTPLT 0.186 
(0.063)*** 
0.074 
(0.024)*** 
 
0.183 
(0.053)*** 
     INST     0.121 
(0.067) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
 
0.078 
(0.056) 
SYST    -0.492 
(0.230)** 
-0.258 
(0.087)*** 
 
-0.059 
(0.193) 
GENDER -0.030 
(0.123) 
-0.049 
(0.046)                                                                                                                       
 
-0.189 
(0.103)** 
MNRAGE     0.008 
(0.09) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
  Adjusted R
2
      
 
 
0.229 
 
0.492 
 
0.226 
    
Number of observations    
    
 
96 
 
96 
 
 
96 
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p=0.01 level. This finding has the predicted sign and confirms our hypothesis. Since 
interpersonal trust is measured by fund managers’ attitudes to their inter-personal 
relationships, the higher the value, the more fund managers have a positive attitude to engage 
in interpersonal relationships.  The result indicates that fund managers who engage more in 
personal relationships or contacts are able to obtain better investment returns. The financial 
market imperfection and the lack of investment protection force investors in the Chinese 
financial market to rely on seeking private information through their inter-personal 
relationships to protect themselves. This result is consistent with those of Lane (2001) who 
suggested that inter-personal trust is usually stronger when institutional infrastructure is weak. 
Moreover, it is also consistent with another branch of Chinese cultural study which suggests 
that China has traditionally had a cultural and historical emphasis on interpersonal relations.   
Results of model 1 also show a positive correlation between Organizational trust variable 
INST and fund managers’ performances. This is also consistent with our prediction. As 
variable INST is an indexed variable based on the measurement of variable OWNERSHIP, 
PROFESSIONAL, REPUTATION, OPENNESS and LEADERSHIP. And these five variables measures 
fund managers’ self-perception of listed companies. Therefore, the more fund manager trust 
in his self-perception, the better his portfolio performance. However, the survey data received 
from responses on the indicators of institutional trust has very low dispersion. The low 
variation of data failed to produce a significant coefficient.  
As can be seen from the results of model 1, system trust variable-SYST is negatively related 
to funds’ performance. The result is significant at p=0.05 level. System trust is measured by 
how much fund managers apply formal public information such as regular financial reports of 
listed companies in their decision making process. In a fund manager’s investment process, 
he uses a mixture of public information and private information.  Private information which 
is obtained through interpersonal networks has advantages of accuracy, timeliness and 
exclusivity, whereas the provision of public information is uniform and publically free to 
anyone. It is hypothesized that the more engagement with private information, the less 
engagement with public information, and vice versa. The result is consistent with the 
expected sign and reveals that fund managers who apply more public information in their 
investment have negative reward. It further confirms that in a market with incomplete 
institutional development and weak legal system enforcement, investors are better off 
obtaining information advantage by exploring private information rather than relying on 
publicly available information.  
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Risk-adjusted performance with process-based trust 
As shown results of model1 in Table 3, a significant positive relationship is found between 
the frequencies that fund managers visit listed companies and their investment performances.  
The positive and significant estimate coefficient indicates that the more often a fund manager 
visits their investment objectives the better their investment performances. This finding is in 
agreement with Dasgupta’s (2001) proposition that face to face communication is a key to 
building a trust relationship and it is also consistent with our predicted sign.    
Furthermore, two dummy variables are applied to investigate further the association between 
communication and fund managers’ stock investment returns. One is whether fund managers 
prefer to visit smaller companies or to visit large companies. Another is whether fund 
managers socialize with listed companies or not. As can be seen from table 3-model 1, 
socializing with listed firms has a negative sign associated with the risk-adjusted returns, 
although the association is not statistically significant. In terms of whether fund managers 
benefit more if they visit small firms rather than large firms, it can be seen from the Table 3 
that the correlation coefficient is positive but not significant. A large amount of research on 
trust suggests the information advantage of dealing with small firms. In stock market 
investment, fund managers go to visit small firms more often than they go to large firms since 
in small firms they are more likely to be able to meet the top management team and this will 
bring them better knowledge of the company. However, for Chinese fund managers, it was 
not found with the current dataset that visiting small rather than large companies helps their 
investment returns. There are several factors which might explain these findings. First, small 
companies have less outstanding shares than large companies. Therefore, they are limited to 
meet the huge demand of shares of mutual funds.  For instance, if a fund manager invests in a 
well-connected listed company, although the return for a single share of this company is quite 
high, with only a limited number of shares are available comparing to large listed companies, 
the investment in small companies is not able to make a large contribution to the performance 
of a fund even though a fund manager has information advantage of a small listed firm. 
Second, according to the Chinese market regulation, there is a so-called two-10% rules 
imposed on all funds. That is, a single fund cannot hold shares of a single listed firm over 10% 
of its net asset and all single funds within one fund management family cannot hold shares of 
a listed firm over 10% of this listed firm’s total market share. This further reduced the 
advantage of possession of better information of small companies by fund managers. 
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Risk-adjusted performance with characteristics of funds 
A set of variables of characteristics of funds are also examined since they have shown great 
effects on funds’ performances in previous research.  
As shown in the results, whether a fund is a closed-end or an open-end fund shows no 
difference in the association of their risk-adjusted performances. This finding is inconsistent 
with our expectation that open-end funds may do better than closed-end funds.  
Style is an indicator of the level of risk that a fund manager is willing to take. Consequently, 
it is an implied indicator of a fund manager’s return under the corresponding risk level. There 
are basically three investment styles of portfolios that are applied by fund managers, namely, 
growth fund, balance fund and income fund. Risks associated with these three styles of funds 
decrease accordingly. In our current dataset of this research, only two styles of funds were 
captured, namely growth fund and balance fund. All funds in the sample are actively 
managed funds which aim not only to pursue capital gains from investment but also to obtain 
dividend payments allocated by listed companies. The results of Model 1 suggest an 
insignificant correlation between fund managers’ investment styles and their performances. 
This finding is inconsistent with Chen et al’s (1992) empirical findings which were 
conducted with 92 American mutual funds.  One possible explanation of the insignificance of 
the coefficient in this research is that the style of a fund as its investment objective is more 
likely to be related to the fund’s beta, which is the indicator of a funds’ risk profile, rather 
than the fund’s alpha, which is a mere indicator of return, although the effect of style is 
significantly related to absolute fund returns, which will be discussed further below.    
Location is picked up as a potential determinant of a fund manager’s performance. China has 
a population of 1.3 billion people and has a large geographical scope. There is a distinct 
cultural difference between northern Chinese and southern Chinese. These distinctions 
include people’s personal characteristics and the way they deal with others (Lin, 1939). For 
example, northern Chinese are said to be more straightforward and bold, southern Chinese 
are more reticent and delicate. Moreover, northern Chinese are said to be more relationship 
oriented, while people from the south are more contract oriented. Therefore, locations of fund 
management companies are applied as an indicator of culture to examine the effect of cultural 
difference among funds on their performances. The results present an insignificant 
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association between such geographical cultural differences and fund managers’ risk-adjusted 
performances suggesting that where the fund management company is headquartered has no 
impact on their fund’s performance.  Although there is no evidence found to support our 
hypotheses, the negative sign indicates that closeness to policy makers may help to avoid 
system risk, but may not help very much on firm specific information.   
As can be seen from the results of Model1, SIZETOTAL which is measured as the total size 
of a fund company is positively related to a fund’s performance.  The possible explanation is 
that the large company has an economy of scale advantage than a smaller company in sharing 
resources among all individual funds within a fund company.   
In terms of the average size of funds, a negative correlation can be seen from the results. It is 
significant at the 5% level. This finding is consistent with Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and 
Ippolito (1989) who found that performance is inversely related to a fund’s size. In the 
Chinese market, larger funds perform worse than smaller funds because large funds prefer to 
buy shares of listed companies who have larger market capitalization. First, large capitalized 
listed companies provide good liquidity. Second, they are much more stable than smaller 
listed companies and less risky. However, the return of investing in large companies is 
usually lower.  
Risk-adjusted performance with characteristics of fund manager 
Fund manager’s personal characteristics are well addressed in behaviour finance research. 
For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) found that younger managers like to hold less 
unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios by “herding” into popular sectors. 
The reason they do so is their strong incentive to be safe in order to keep their current 
position. In terms of the relationship between fund managers’ age and their performance, they 
show that the age of fund managers is inversely related to a fund’s simple excess return. In 
contrast to the past literature, Results of model 1 shows no significant association between 
the age of fund managers and their performance. The explanation could be that there is not 
enough variation in fund managers’ ages which is derived from the short history of the 
Chinese fund management industry.  The Chinese fund management industry has a very short 
history which is less than 10 years, so the ages of fund managers are concentrated within a 
very small range. 
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 Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) found female American fund managers are more risk averse. In 
our regression analysis, we examined the relationship between gender and fund managers’ 
performance. It is found that the association is insignificant.  
Discussion on Model 2 
Absolute performance with interpersonal, institutional and system trust  
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the absolute investment return of fund managers- 
ABSTKRTN.  The reason for applying both of these two performance measurements are: 
first, Jensen’s alpha is the most common measurement applied in evaluation of performance 
of mutual funds. Second, absolute return is used in this research as it fits the purpose of this 
research most.  
There are a number of important similarities and differences of results between Model 1 and 
Model 2. 
From the empirical results of model 2, interpersonal trust variable INTPLT is found to be 
positively and significantly related to fund managers’ absolute investment returns. The 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding confirms our expectations 
and is consistent with our hypotheses.   
In terms of the institutional trust variable-INST, the results of Model 2 present a negative 
relationship between variable INST and fund managers’ absolute performances. Compared to 
the predicted sign, it is the wrong sign. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
As can be seen from the results of Model 2, the estimated coefficient between the system 
trust variable SYST and funds’ absolute returns is negative and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The result suggests that there is a strong inverse association between fund 
managers’ attitude towards public information and their investment performance. The more 
they trust public information, the worse their absolute investment returns. The result confirms 
our expectation of predicted sign and it is also consistent with the result produced with risk-
adjusted returns. 
 
Absolute performance with process-based trust 
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In contrast to the regression result of Model 1 which is run on risk-adjusted performance, the 
frequency of visiting variable VISITTOTAL- also presents the predicted, positive but not  
significant sign in relation to funds’ absolute returns. One possible explanation could be that 
the variable VISITTOTAL only measures the quantity of communication, but it is not able to 
measure the quality of communication. The variable is measured by the total number of visits 
that fund managers make to listed companies per year. The inconsistency with our predicted 
sign indicates that fund managers’ absolute investment returns are not sensitive to the number 
of communications. As material information is usually exclusive, therefore the quality of 
information is more important than the quantity of communications.  We find a positive 
significant association in Model 1 between risk-adjusted returns and the total number of visits, 
but the coefficient is very small.  
The coefficient between variable VISITSMALL and funds’ absolute returns shows a negative 
association, which is inconsistent with our expectations and inconsistent with the result of 
model 1. However, in both models, the results are insignificant. The same reason is applied as 
explained in the interpretation of Model 1 for the insignificant association.  
 A positive sign is shown between variable SOCIALIZEFIRM and fund managers’ absolute 
returns, which is consistent with our predicted sign, although it is not statistically significant.  
Absolute performance with characteristics of fund 
As shown from the previous results of Model 1, types of funds TYPE do as not show any 
impact on funds’ risk-adjusted performances. On the contrary, from the results of Model 2, it 
shows that types of funds have a significant effect on fund managers’ absolute equity 
investment returns and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with 
our expectation and predicted sign. In the Chinese stock market open-end funds usually 
perform better than closed-end funds which derive from the motivation difference between 
open-end and closed-end fund managers.  For open-end funds, the managers’ compensation 
depends on the size of the asset under his management. A good performance is the only and 
direct reason to attract more investment. Therefore, open-end fund managers have a much 
stronger motivation to produce superior performance. Nevertheless, for a closed-end fund, the 
number of issued shares is fixed during its life. Therefore, closed-end fund managers have 
less incentive to pursue a superior return.  
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Another significant estimate coefficient is found between average size of funds- 
AVERAGESIZE and their performances.  This finding is the same as the finding in Model 1 
suggesting an inverse relationship between size and performance. The result is consistent 
with most empirical financial research which claims that the transaction cost is larger for 
large size of funds.  
The rest of the variables- for instance, style of a fund-STYLE, location of a fund management 
company-LOCATION, total size of a fund company SIZETOTAL- do not show any 
significant impact on funds’ absolute performances. The results are the same as the results in 
Model 1. The same interpretations are applied.   
Absolute performance with characteristics of fund managers 
Gender and age of fund managers show no significant correlation with their performances, 
although in the financial literature, female managers are found more risk averse.  In terms of 
the impact of fund managers’ ages on their performances, scholars do not agree with each 
other about the direction of relationship based on different datasets.   
Discussion on Model 3 
Model 3 aims to examine the impacts of different types of trust on fund managers’ market 
timing performances.   
Timing with interpersonal, institutional and system trust  
As can be seen from the results of Model 3 in Table3, one unanticipated finding is that the 
system trust variable SYST shows a negative sign in relation to the market timing variable, 
which is contrary to our expectations, although the result is not statistically significant. It was 
hypothesized in Hypothesis 3 that fund managers who have more trust in the system would 
do no worse in predicting market movement. However, no evidence was found with the 
current dataset between SYST and fund managers’ market timing. 
Surprisingly, the results show that the interpersonal trust variable is positively related to fund 
managers’ timing performance and is significant at the 1% level.  The finding seems to 
indicate that fund managers who place more trust on interpersonal relationships also have a 
larger cash position adjustment. It suggests that fund managers might predict market 
movement based on private information from interpersonal relationships and the more they 
incline toward private relationships the larger the adjustment of their investment and cash 
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holding. One of the issues that emerge from this finding is that interpersonal trust involves 
every aspects of performance. 
 Variable INS shows a positive sign in relating to fund managers’ market timing, but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Variable INS is designed to capture organizational 
trust, which is supposed to be directly related to fund managers’ judgment on publically 
traded companies. This is therefore supposed to influent more a fund managers’ investment 
returns rather than their market timing. 
Timing with process trust   
As can be seen from the results of Model 3, variable VISITTOTAL shows a negative 
association with fund managers’ cash position adjustment and is statistically significant. The 
result indicates that the more visits made by a fund manager, the less adjustment of their cash 
position they make, which is consistent with our hypothesis that if  managers possess more 
firm specific information, they will be less concerned about market movements. This result 
seems conflict with the positive and significant sign between interpersonal trust and fund 
managers’ timing, however, it can be explained by the difference between variable 
VISITTOTAL and variable interpersonal trust INTPLT.  
VISITSMALL also shows an inverse relationship with fund managers’ market timing, which 
is also consistent with our predicted sign. However, the association is not statistically 
significant. The insignificance might derive from the indirect association between the two 
variables. Obviously, dependent variable-cash position adjustment depends mainly on a fund 
manager’s prediction of the market movement in the future, whereas dummy variable 
VISITSMALL only measures whether a fund manager visits small companies more than 
large companies.  As suggested by a number of researches into small firm effect, the variable 
is most likely related to investment returns. However, no evidence is found with our dataset 
that variable-VISITSMALL has impact on either the investment returns variable or the 
market timing variable. 
SOCIALIZEFIRM presents a positive significant association with the market timing variable 
which is different from our predicted sign. As we hypothesized, a fund manager who is 
deeply engaged in socializing with listed companies might undermine their ability of market 
timing. However, the result seems to suggest that fund managers who socialize with listed 
firms adjust their cash position more actively in a larger range.  
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VIII.Robustness checks 
Trust variables are mostly measured with Likert-scale measurement, which is consistent with 
researches of this kind. The correlation matrix of independent variables in models applied 
also shows there is no problem of multicollinearity.    
The results are robust across different models.  Although fixed-factor models were used, the 
direction of causality in this research is plausible. 
For example, one can argue that fund managers with better performance may be provided 
with private information by listed company in order to get reciprocal benefit. However, 
personal trust is measured as the extent to which fund managers prefer interpersonal trust. It 
is less convincing to argue that performance determines the way how fund managers observe 
better information for making investment decision.  Furthermore, thinking of the question 
whether listed company would leak information to better performed fund managers or 
whether the information will only be shared by someone who he trusts, it seems more logic 
and reliable that trust will influence performance rather than the other way around. 
Nevertheless, caution should be taken on the limitation of the models derived by the cross-
sectional nature of the research design. In the future, longitudinal research would be preferred 
to shed light on the validity of the causal links.  
IX.Conclusion  
One of the most significant findings that emerged from this study was that personal trust has 
a positive and significant impact on both fund managers’ stock selection performance and 
market timing. It suggests that in Chinese stock markets where there is a lack of reliable 
public information, trust via interpersonal networks can help to overcome the problem of 
information asymmetry. It is also consistent with the view that in contemporary China, trust 
within close personal networks is still very strong and remains an important component of 
Chinese culture. This finding indirectly questions the proposition advanced by Zuck (1986) 
that there is a general trend for modern societies to generate more organizational trust and 
lower levels of the characteristic-based trust created through families and friends. 
Surprisingly, the results also show that personal trust has a positive impact on fund managers’ 
market timing. It indicates that fund managers’ broad forecasting of the market’s movements 
was influenced by personal trust. This finding is unexpected given this paper’s proposed 
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hypotheses, but confirms that Chinese stock markets have a strong interpersonal-based 
character.  
System trust has an adverse impact on stock selection but shows no impact on fund managers’ 
market timing. As system trust is measured by how much institutional investors trust public 
information, such as financial disclosures issued by listed companies, this finding indicates 
that a Chinese fund manager who relies heavily on public information in his decision making 
process will tend to have a worse portfolio return. However, no evidence was found that 
system trust is related to fund managers’ timing ability.  
Organizational trust as proposed by this paper failed to produce any significant association 
with either fund managers’ stock selection performance or their market timing. The 
insignificant results are likely to have been caused by the low dispersion of data on investors’ 
trust in institutional characteristics.  
Interactions between fund managers and listed companies are also examined empirically in 
this research. A positive significant association is found between the frequency that fund 
managers visited listed companies and their total risk-adjusted returns. The result indicates 
that the more often a fund manager visited their investment objectives, the better was their 
performance. In contrast, process trust shows no correlation with fund managers’ market 
timing.  
It was found that the frequency of visiting correlated positively with fund managers’ selection 
performance, but not with timing.  When single item trust variables were applied in 
regressions, LOYALTY was positive and significantly related to absolute stock selection 
performances.  
In the context of the efficient market hypotheses, the above findings suggest that the Chinese 
stock market is a strong-form inefficient market.  
 
                                            X. Contributions and Recommendations 
The first implication of this research is that personal trust has a positive and significant 
impact on both fund managers’ stock selection performance and market timing. The finding 
not only identifies an important driver of cross-sectional differences in the performance of 
mutual funds, but also implies that socially well connected funds on average enjoy better 
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investment performance. The first implication is therefore that mutual fund investors should 
select well connected mutual funds for their investments. On the side of mutual funds, an 
implication is that being well-connected should be an important strategic consideration when 
the company is recruiting and training fund managers, especially in the Chinese financial 
markets.  
The second implication can be drawn from the finding that system trust has an adverse 
impact on stock selection but shows no impact on fund managers’ market timing. It implies 
that in the Chinese stock market, public information and private information are substitutes 
for each other. When private information is used mainly for checking the reliability of public 
information, particularly when private information is obtained by making visits to listed 
companies, it will induce additional costs that should not occur if the credibility of financial 
disclosure could be guaranteed by the legislation system. Therefore, one important policy 
implication is that Chinese market regulators have to improve constantly the credibility and 
transparency of public information. Although it is a tough job for regulators in different 
markets, the newly employed whistle blower programme in America (SEC) can be worth 
trying in Chinese market, even though the programme has its own flaws.   
Third, as the global economy increasingly dominates national economies, it is particularly 
important for fund managers to equip themselves with a knowledge of how trust operates, 
which includes not only how to cultivate trust within an institution, but also how to govern 
trust with outside partners who may come from a different cultural background.  
Limitations:  
 Although several important findings emerged from this research, many questions still remain 
to be addressed by future research. For instance, firstly, how are personal ties formed 
between fund managers and the firms in which they invest, and what are the costs associated 
with becoming well-connected?  Secondly, do the results obtained in this study generalize to 
other economies, and if so are they confined to non-western countries or countries which are 
still undergoing rapid development? 
Given the evidence that the higher personal trust increases investment returns, comparative 
studies could be done in the future to further examine whether such a result is consistent 
among different cultures. Further studies could also be conducted using longitudinal data to 
examine the persistence of the impact of Confucian-based culture on business performance.  
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Appendix  
          (1) Structure of questionnaire  
 
 
Characteristics of fund 
 
 
Question 
 
Property 
 
Value 
 
TYPE (fund type, open-
end=1, or 0 otherwise) 
 
whether a fund is open-ended, or closed-end 
 
binary 0, 1 
STYLE (style of a fund, 
1=growth, 0 = otherwise) 
 
investment style is a growth fund or a balance fund 
 
 
binary 0, 1 
AGE( age of fund, in year) 
 
how many years a fund has been established 
 
 
interval 3-8 
SIZETOTAL( total net asset 
of a fund) 
total net asset of  a fund management company interval 10-180 
AVERAGESIZE Three year average net asset of a fund interval 2-100 
LOCATION ( northern area 
=1, or 0 otherwise) 
Whether a fund company is located in northern area or 
southern area of China  
binary 0,1 
 
System trust 
   
SYST 
How much weight would you like to give to listed 
firms’ regular disclosures 
interval  
50%-
100% 
 
Personal trust  
 
(Likert scale 1=strongly disagree,2,3,4,5=strongly 
agree) 
 
  
VISITFRIEND 
can get useful information when have friends in listed 
firms 
integer  1,2,3,4,5 
 
INSIDERINF get insider information is essential 
integer 1,2,3,4,5 
VISITLONG 
can get useful information when maintaining a long 
relationship with them 
integer 1,2,3,4,5 
HIGHTRUST 
When bad news comes, is it important to contact firms 
first then take further action 
integer 1,2,3,4,5 
INTPLT 
Average score of visitfriends, visitlong, hightrust and 
insiderinf 
interval 1-5 
 
Organizational trust  
 
( Likert scale 1=strongly 
disagree,2,3,4,5=strongly agree) 
  
OWNERSHIP ownership of a listed firm is essential integer  1,2,3,4,5 
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PROFESSIONAL professional standards of a listed firm is essential integer  1,2,3,4,5 
REPUTATION reputation of a listed firm is essential integer  1,2,3,4,5 
OPENNESS openness of a listed firm is essential integer  1,2,3,4,5 
LEADERSHIP leadership of a listed firm is essential integer  1,2,3,4,5 
INST 
 
average score of ownership, professional, reputation, 
openness and leadership 
interval 1-5 
 
Interaction  
  
 
 
 
 
TIMETOTAL ( times of 
total visiting ) 
how many times visit listed firms per year 
 
interval  0-100 
VISITSMALL(1= yes, or 
0 otherwise) 
whether go to small listed firms more than go to large 
listed firms 
binary  0,1 
SOCIALIZEFIRM(1=yes, 
or 0 otherwise)  
whether socialize with firms  
 
 
binary  0,1 
 
Characteristics of fund 
managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GENDER 
 
male or female 
 
binary  0,1 
MNRAGE 
 
Age of fund manager 
 
interval 25-45 
 
(2) Regression results of predicted signs vs. actual signs 
 Risk-adjusted portfolio 
performance   (predicted 
sign/actual sign)  
Absolute return of 
portfolio performance   
(predicted sign/actual sign) 
Timing 
(predicted sign/actual sign) 
Characteristics of Funds    
TYPE (open=1, close=0) 
STYLE  
LOCATION 
SIZETOTAL 
AVERAGESIZE 
+/+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/(+) 
-/(-) 
+/(+) 
+/+ 
+/- 
+/+ 
-/(-) 
-/- 
+/+ 
+/+ 
+/- 
-/- 
Process Trust  
 
   
VISITTOTAL 
VISITSMALL 
SOCIALIZFIRM  
+/(+) 
+/+ 
+/- 
+/+ 
+/- 
+/+ 
-/(-) 
-/- 
-/(+) 
Interpersonal Trust 
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INTPLT  
 
+/(+) 
 
+/(+) -/(+) 
 
Organizational  
 
   
INST +/+ 
 
+/- 
 
-/+ 
 
System Trust    
SYST 
 
-/(-) -/(-) +/- 
Characteristics of Fund 
Managers 
   
GENDER 
MNRAGE 
 
 
+/- 
+/+ 
+/- 
+/+ 
+/(-) 
+/+ 
Notes: actual signs in brackets are statically significant 
 
